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The Free Aceh Movement:
Islam and Democratisation1
DAMIEN KINGSBURY
School of International and Political Studies, Deakin University, Australia
ABSTRACT The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has been characterised by some observers and
the Indonesian government as being a radical Islamic organisation intent on establishing an
Islamic state in northern Sumatra. This article explores GAM’s relationship with Islam and
shows that while GAM members are devout Muslims and that Islam pervades their political
thinking, the organisation and its members are explicitly opposed to the creation of an Islamic
state or the imposition of Islamic law. The article reports how senior members of GAM’s hierar-
chy discuss their personal relationship with Islam, noting consistencies and diﬀerences in their ap-
proaches. A common theme is that Islam provides a motive for the struggle, based on notions of
justice and equality, and that these and related aspects of Acehnese political organisation provide
the groundwork for a functional form of democracy in Aceh’s post-peace settlement environment.
KEY WORDS: Islam, law, state, separatism, justice, equality
The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Acheh Merdeka, or GAM2) has often been
characterised as an Islamic organisation, not least by the Government of Indonesia
(see, for example, Kingsbury, 2001; Al Ahram [Cairo], 15 November 2001). Despite
clear Islamic inﬂuences, GAM is a nationalist organisation the political goals of
which are explicitly based on territory rather than religion.3 Further, explicit in the
political agenda of GAM is the ending of the imposition of syariah (Islamic law
which nominally governs all facets of living) in Aceh. According to the Prime
Minister of the State of Aceh, Malik Mahmud, ‘‘GAM opposed the imposition of
Syariah Laws in Acheh by Jakarta because GAM’s struggle is motivated by and
based on independence and not on religious issues. Jakarta is merely using syariah
laws as a propaganda ploy to deviate public opinion from the real issue of the
conﬂict.’’4
On 15 August 2005, GAM signed a peace agreement to end almost 30 years of
conﬂict intended to gain independence from Indonesia. Until the signing of the
Helsinki agreement, GAM had proposed that as an independent state, Aceh would
be founded upon democratic principles and civil law. Indeed, the imposition of
syariah by the Jakarta government and the establishment of syariah courts in Aceh
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was strongly opposed by GAM. GAM argued that the imposition of syariah did not
reﬂect an Acehnese understanding of Islam and functioned as a further method of
oppression of the Acehnese people. The prevailing view among GAM has been that
Acehnese do not require that syariah be imposed for them to have their lives imbued
with Islam. According to the leader of GAM in Malaysia, Muhammad Nur Djuli
(2005: 2):
Major news agencies, after accurately reporting atrocious incidents perpetrated
by Indonesian security forces in Acheh, quite often explain that the conﬂict is
about Achehnese attempting to establish a fundamentalist Islamic State and
that Indonesia has accorded the so-called Syariah law for Acheh in order to
appease the ‘‘rebels’’. To be clear, the ASNLF [the Acheh-Sumatra National
Liberation Front is GAM’s formal name] does not wish to establish a
fundamentalist Islamic state, and does not accept the imposition of Syariah law.
If Islamic law is to be accepted by the Achehnese people, it must be of a type
decided by the Achehnese people themselves in a public ballot. It cannot be
imposed from outside.
This article will explore how these devoutMuslims promote an Islamic-inﬂuenced but
not an Islamic-determined political agenda, while still acknowledging Islam as basic
to their political struggle. The distinction between an Islamic-inﬂuenced and an
Islamic-determined state is understood to refer to the diﬀerence between a state that is
imbued with Islamic values (an inﬂuenced state) and a state that is predicated upon
syariah as such (a determined state). The key characteristic is that in an Islamic-
inﬂuenced state, the moral basis of social codes of behaviour derives from Islam, but
as social codes they ﬁnd expression in civil law rather than religious law. This may
allow for the imposition of civil law based on Islamic tenets (e.g., regarding gamb-
ling), but with such laws being adjudicated through civil courts rather than syariah
courts. While this article addresses Islam as it is practised in Aceh, and in particular
the perceptions of Islam that are held by members of GAM, it only brieﬂy considers
wider issues about Islam in relation to the civil state and democracy, as the variety of
interpretations make such an overview impractical in an article of this length.
Views on Non-Political Islam
The considerable discussions of Islam and politics, including the non-intervention of
Islam within the political realm, have tended to focus on either more recent liberal
interpretations of Islam (e.g., Saeed, 2003, 2006; Saeed and Johns, 2004; Sardar,
2004; Barton, 2002; Madjid, 1997), or on the necessity of constructing a secular state
as a means of modernisation (e.g., Lewis, 2002; Dagi, 2001; Kinzer, 2001, Zurcher,
2004). Discussions of Indonesia generally and GAM in particular tend to fall into the
latter category, with the developmentalist state under President Suharto being seen,
in some respects, to have followed Turkey. GAM, however, had not much focused
on development issues, at least in a conventional economic sense, until the Helsinki
peace talks of 2005 when it was required to present a series of economic proposals.
GAM’s leadership had discussed the relationship between Islam and the state
within the context of what might be called ‘‘political development’’ (see Sen, 1999;
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Anderson, von der Mehden and Young, 1967) and while there was no stepping away
from Islam, GAM’s commitment to a civil rather than religious state had been in
place since the mid-1980s. That Turkey had historically been seen by Acehnese as an
ally of Aceh was perhaps coincidental, although this similarity of approach between
Turkey and GAM on the question of civil rather than religious authority, which
paralleled that of Jakarta, was acknowledged by senior GAM members. Notably,
GAM’s understanding that the role of the Wali Nanggroe (State Protector/Head of
State) is to ensure a suitable environment for the observance of Islam parallels
Saeed’s view that any state that protects freedom of religion, including Islam,
corresponds to formal Islamic requirements (Saeed, forthcoming).
Within Indonesia, there were (and remain) a number of streams of Islamic
thinking in relation to the state, with the dominant view being that the state should
be sympathetic towards Islam but not ruled by it. This was exempliﬁed by the
presidencies of Sukarno and Suharto and is embedded in the state ideology of
Pancasila (Five Principles), one of which aﬃrms a requirement for belief in one god,
without specifying the religious character of that god (ﬁve monotheistic religions are
regarded as acceptable) and hence steers away from the requirements of syariah.
While the Pancasila has tended to be identiﬁed with prescriptive and authoritarian
approaches to development, the Islamic liberalism of former President Aburrahman
Wahid and noted Islamic scholar Nurcholish Madjid, among others, has also tended
to coincide with the views of the liberal Islamic scholar Abdullah Saeed and GAM
that the role of the civil state was to allow the unfettered practice of religion but not
be dominated by it.
Islam and Aceh
Islam was established in Aceh comparatively early in the history of the South-East
Asia region. Islam ﬁrst entered the Indonesian archipelago, along with Arabic and
Indian traders, through Aceh some time after 800 AD. It is part of the mythologising
of Aceh’s past not just by GAM but by Acehnese more generally that the ﬁrst
Islamic kingdom, Perlak, was established within the region of Aceh in the year 804.
According to the Liang Annals (502-56 AD), Chinese traders had referred to an area
within Aceh as the Buddhist state of Po-Li (Stein, 1907: 34n), and Perlak (possibly
the same as Po-Li) was probably established as a trading port by the ninth century,
given that the Sailendra Dynasty in Java was ﬂourishing at this time and that it
conducted international trade. Indian and Arabic texts from around the ninth
century also mention this area as a part of their trading routes. Montana (1997:
85-95) notes that there is evidence to show the existence of an Islamic community at
Nissam and Lamuri from the beginning of the twelfth century, while the Acehnese
region of Samudra-Pase was recognised as having a Muslim ruler, Sultan Malik al-
Salih, by the late thirteenth century (Djajadiningrat, 1958). Over the next 600 years
the kingdoms of the region, including Samudra (later Pasai or Pase, and after which
Sumatra was later named) and Pidie, combined with Aceh Besar to form Aceh. As
Siegel (1969: 4) noted, since this time, ‘‘The history of Atjeh [sic.] is told largely in
terms of Islam and trade.’’ In particular, Aceh’s focus on trade gave it an orientation
towards India, the Arab states and the Ottoman Empire, rather than focusing on the
archipelago (Reid, 2006; McKinnon, 2006).
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Like most of Southeast Asia, Islam in Aceh is predominantly Sunni (Sunnah wal
Jamaah) and like most Muslims in the region, Acehnese are disciples of the Syaﬁi
doctrine, although also recognising the four major schools of Sunni: Syaﬁi, Hanaﬁ,
Hanbali and Maliki. Imam Syaﬁi is believed by many Acehnese to have been the
most careful if liberal of the four great Imams of Islam, although he was known to
err towards being conservative when faced with ambiguity. The Syaﬁi branch also
has two (or arguably three) sub-branches. There are quite a few diﬀerences between
the Acehnese and Malaysian interpretations of the Syaﬁi doctrine, for example in the
matter of divorce (which is more liberal in Aceh). About 10% of Acehnese are Shia
Muslims, although there is little if any reported conﬂict over this division. Contrary
to some belief, although Acehnese Muslims are generally tolerant, probably a
reﬂection of historically accepting foreign inﬂuences, the more mystical Suﬁist
version of Islam has had only passing popularity. The militant Wahhabist (much less
Qtbist) version of Islam has been even less popular in Aceh, running counter to the
general Acehnese sense of tolerance and a common pre-occupation with material
aﬀairs. As Islam’s starting point in the archipelago, and the last point of departure
for the hajj, Aceh is believed to have been named by Arab traders as Mecca’s
Verandah (Serambi Mekkah). It is usually suggested that it was from Aceh that Islam
spread to the rest of the archipelago, dating from around the thirteenth century.
Aceh, Jihad and the Struggle for Independence5
The history of Acehnese struggle against external aggression has been characterised
by many Acehnese as jihad, or holy struggle, which implies a particularly Islamic
understanding of the notion of such struggle. Aceh’s war against the Portuguese in
the early seventeenth century was proclaimed a jihad against kepir (from the
Arabic kaﬁr, or inﬁdel), as was the Acehnese opposition to Dutch invasion in 1873
(Alﬁan, 2006).
On 19 May 2003, the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia – TNI)
launched its largest military operation since the invasion of East Timor in December
1975. For many Acehnese, this war was viewed as a continuation of jihad. The return
to full-scale military activity followed the collapse of talks in Tokyo aimed at
resolving tensions that had arisen during the preceding ‘‘Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement’’ (CoHA), signed the previous 9 December (CoHA, 2002). The CoHA
was ostensibly to allow the opportunity to discuss a negotiated settlement to the
conﬂict that had been ravaging the region since secessionists unilaterally declared
independence for its four million people on 4 December 1976 (ASNLF, 1976).
Aspinall and Crouch (2003) claim the breakdown of the talks was because GAM and
the Indonesian government were unable to reach a compromise on their respective
positions of accepting Special Autonomy and complete independence. This inter-
pretation is incorrect. GAM accepted the ﬁnal Indonesian proposal on a political
resolution to allow the CoHA to continue, but this was followed by a further
Indonesian government demand that GAM disarm – eﬀectively to surrender – and
accept ‘‘special autonomy’’ for Aceh under the name of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam
(NAD – Peaceful State of Aceh). This was eﬀectively a demand for GAM to
surrender. GAM refused and the talks broke down. This rejection provided the
pretext for the TNI’s renewed military operation.6 Over the next two months, under
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a state of martial law, the 32,000 soldiers and paramilitary police sent in readiness
for the seemingly inevitable end of the CoHA was increased to just under 60,0007
and widespread ﬁghting and social dislocation resumed.
The separatist conﬂict in Aceh had been perhaps the most emotionally divisive
in Indonesia’s recent history, particularly after 78.5% of East Timorese voted to
leave Indonesia in a UN-administered ballot in 1999, which heightened fears of
Indonesia’s break-up, for political ‘‘nationalist’’ and strategic reasons. Aceh had
been one of the few pre-colonial territories of what was to become Indonesia that
was internationally recognised as a separate and sovereign state (Reid, 1969, 1979;
Sjamsuddin, 1985), which was seen by some to strengthen its claim to a separate
identity. In relation to this, throughout Aceh’s history has been a strong claim to
defending itself against outsiders (Reid, 1979) Most notably, when the Dutch
invaded in 1873, the Acehnese fought against them until most of their leadership
were killed or captured by around 1912. Even after 1912, there continued to be
sporadic attacks against the Dutch in Aceh, which continued until the Japanese
invasion of 1942, from which time the Acehnese turned their attention to the
Japanese. In 1945 Indonesia declared independence, which was strongly supported in
Aceh, notably by sending troops against the Dutch in North Sumatra, but seemingly
on the understanding that, reﬂecting local ‘‘nationalist’’ aspirations, it would lead to
independence or a high degree of local autonomy within a loose federal structure.
Indonesia was initially constructed, in 1949, as a federal republic, potentially
allowing considerable scope for self-determination on the part of constituent states.
However, when Indonesia was unilaterally reconstituted as a unitary state in 1950,
Aceh’s quasi-autonomous status was lost and in the following year, Aceh was
subsumed into North Sumatra. Failing to resolve this loss of autonomy, in 1953,
Aceh’s governor, Teungku Daud Beureueh, declared Aceh’s independence from
Indonesia, initially joining with the Darul Islam Indonesia (DII) rebellion, declaring
the independence of the Federated State of Aceh (Negara Bahagian Acheh – NBA),
later joining with the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia-Perjuangan
Semesta (PRRI-Permesta, or Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
Indonesia – Overall Struggle) rebellion8 as a means of securing this claim.9 In a
bid to satisfy Aceh’s aspirations, a nominal ‘‘special administrative’’ status was
granted to it by Jakarta in 1959 (accepted in 1963). Beyond relative autonomy in
religious, educational and cultural matters, this turned out to have little meaning in
practice. However, the 1950s were a period of the re-assertion of Acehnese identity,
which has been claimed by GAM as constituting the basis of the current struggle for
independence (see Reid, 2004; also Kell, 1995).10
In the period following the rise of Indonesia’s New Order government and its
increased emphasis on international partnerships in mineral exploitation, Aceh
found itself subject to economic domination by interests primarily located in Jakarta,
with a consequent loss of potential wealth accruing to Jakarta. In particular,
exploration in 1972 showed large liquid natural gas (LNG) deposits oﬀ the coast of
Aceh, and in 1973 the Indonesian government signed a sales contract for the export
of this LNG (Purnomo, 2003) which almost completely excluded Acehnese economic
interests, in turn leading to signiﬁcant local resentment. This resentment was
manifested in the resurrection of the idea of Acehnese independence among a
relatively small number of Acehnese intellectuals. To put substance to this claim, on
170 D. Kingsbury
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4 December 1976, Teungku (Lord) Muhammad Hasan di Tiro proclaimed Aceh as
an independent state, launching the GAM movement.
The history of the conﬂict since 1976 is generally located in three phases.
The period from 1976 to 1989 was the ﬁrst phase, in which about 600 GAM recruits
were trained in Libya. In response to an increased GAM military eﬀort, the military
undertook a counter-insurgency operation, known as the ‘‘Military Operations
Area’’ (DOM – Daerah Operasi Militer) until 1998, which constituted the second
phase. In the period from 1989 until 1998, it has been variously estimated that
between 10,000 and 26,000 people were killed in Aceh.11 The third phase followed
the fall of Suharto in May 1998, when there were brief reversals of Indonesia’s
oﬃcial military policy on Aceh, such as the withdrawal of Kopassus (special forces)
troops in 1998 and the formal lifting of military operations. This situation was
reversed with a new military operation in 1999, which was notable for its massacres
of civilians (see Tapol, 2000a; 2000b). The military was again reigned in with the
signing of a ‘‘humanitarian ceaseﬁre’’ on 12 May 2000 and again for three months
from June 2000. It was around this time that Aceh’s ‘‘civil society’’ movement
reached the peak of its inﬂuence, with a march of between several hundred thousand
and a million people in Banda Aceh on 8 November 1999, and a similarly sized rally
in November the following year, where the military and police did much to
intimidate protesters, including a number of murders meant to prevent the rally from
taking place. By 2001, the TNI increased troop numbers in Aceh to more than
30,000, while leading generals had overwhelmingly rejected then President
Abdurrahman Wahid’s peace eﬀorts and again pushed for a full-scale military
‘‘resolution’’ to the insurgency.
On 19 January 2001, a seven-month ceaseﬁre was extended for another month,
following all-party talks in Switzerland, and Aceh was made a ‘‘special adminis-
trative region,’’ which in theory gave it a greater level of local autonomy beyond that
granted to sub-provincial regions under the 2001 autonomy legislation.12 However,
in practical terms, that status has counted for very little and was widely seen to be
long on rhetoric and short on application. By early 2001, GAM was estimated to
control around 60% of Aceh, and had assumed responsibility for government
services such as education, health care and infrastructure.13
In January 2002 the Indonesian government announced the introduction of special
autonomy status including the implementation of Islamic syariah law and greater
revenue-sharing of its natural resources. However, as Schulze (2004: 55) has noted,
‘‘the special autonomy . . . has not really been implemented.’’ In December 2002,
GAM and the government of Indonesia signed the CoHA, which was beset with
diﬃculties over competing views as to its purpose and which was undermined in
particular by the use of TNI-backed militias (Aspinall and Crouch, 2003). The TNI
pressed for an end to the ceaseﬁre, which it engineered at the ﬁnal meeting in Tokyo
on 19 May 2003, and the resumption of full-scale hostilities from that time until the
signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on 15 August 2005.
GAM’s Political Modelling
The Islamic political identity of GAM was, as mentioned above, enhanced by Aceh’s
participation in the Darul Islam Rebellion of the 1950s and by GAM’s subsequent
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claims to being descended from the Darul Islam rebellion lineage. That virtually all
GAM members are devout Sunni Muslims has further led some observers to believe
that it is an Islamic organisation (see Nicksh, 2002).
In Acehnese political tradition, the state is construed as the guardian of the rights
of its citizens, including the right to practice their religion without hindrance. This
reﬂects one of the traditional roles of the head of state, being either the sultan or the
Wali Nanggroe (‘‘state guardian’’). Historically, the main function of the sultan was
to ensure that Islam and syariah were able to be practised; according to Siegel (1969:
39) quoting from the Adat Atjeh, a nineteenth century book of Acehnese customary
law, based on earlier accounts of such law, ‘‘ . . . the sultan was the protector of the
law, and the state existed so that the law could be administered. . . . Kings become the
lieutenants of God on earth . . .’’. This model states that syariah is indeed practised,
but the important element of it is that the king is identiﬁed primarily with protecting
the syariah, not imposing it.
GAM’s view of politics is further inﬂuenced by traditional Acehnese models which
contain elements of both a proto-democracy and a ‘‘complex balance of power’’
(Nazaruddin, 1985: 17). This ‘‘complex balance of power’’ usually refers to the
mediating inﬂuences of the sultan, the traditional lords (uleebelang) and the clergy
(ulama) (see Siegel, 1969: 29-67; also Kell, 1995: 6; Marsden, 1966: 403-5; Loeb,
1974: 211-2). These practices have existed since the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda
(1609-36). Power sharing at this level was traditionally (and remains) expressed
through what is referred to by GAM, according to Malik Mahmud, as the ‘‘state
code’’: ‘‘Adat bak Po Teumeureuhom, Hukom bak Syah Kuala, Kanun bak Putroe
Phang, Reusam bak Bentara’’ (‘‘Power rests with the king, Law with the great imam
of Syah Kuala, Tradition with the Princess of Pahang14 and Regulations with the
Bentara’’15). Malik Mahmud conﬁrmed that the references applied primarily to the
ﬁrst two elements of the ‘‘state code,’’ and was frequently used by GAM members in
their oﬃcial letters in Acehnese. Deleting the role of the Princess of Pahang, which
refers to cultural matters, this traditional political system reﬂected a triumvirate in
which no individual (or single group) dominated the political process. In a more
developed sense, these three positions have been characterised by some Acehnese as
comprising a form of trias politica, or the three key areas of state administration
divided by the separation of powers into discreet areas of responsibility, thus
ensuring a political balance which is usually regarded as necessary in a functioning
democracy (usually referring to the executive, the legislature and the judiciary). That
is, there was a balance between administrative, legal and religious inﬂuences in
traditional Acehnese life, and not just the blanket application of syariah.
Similarly, at the local level, the Acehnese traditional administrative system was
administered by a collective leadership under the above-noted approximation of the
separation of powers. This system was replaced by a more hierarchical Javanese
model under the New Order government, although it was reinstituted in areas
liberated by GAM. At a local level, the three above-noted positions complied with a
village chief (geuchik) as well as the bentara and imam. The geuchik was assisted by
two councils of four and eight elders (respectively to advise of speciﬁc issues and to
provide general council). The imam interpreted law, being by deﬁnition literate in the
kitab sirat (written guidance) and traditionally, in some cases, the only literate
member of the village. The council of four elders implemented these laws and the
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council of eight elders considered and advised on relevant matters (see Loeb, 1974:
227-9). All oﬃce holders were elected, although it was common for the geuchik and
the imam to be virtually hereditary, it being common to elect the eldest son to replace
the father (Djuli, 2005:6). Law as it was or in some cases still is locally administered,
would reﬂect the social codiﬁcation of broad Islamic values, although it may also
reﬂect speciﬁc aspects of syariah.
According to Nur Djuli, it was GAM’s intention that if Aceh achieved
independence it would create a democratic society (Personal communication, 21
November 2004). The Stavanger Declaration, in which the ASNLF established the
Government of the State of Aceh (Peumeurintah Neugara Acheh), stipulates that the
system of government in Aceh was to be based on democratic elections (ASNLF,
2002). This democratic preference has also been reﬂected in the MOU signed
between GAM and the Government of Indonesia, which is explicitly democratic in
its orientation (MOU, 2005: 1.1-1 1.2.8; see also GAM, 2005a, b, c). Indeed the
extent to which Aceh would become democratic, which GAM favoured, was the
most critical element of the negotiations that achieved the MOU.
However, earlier statements by GAM’s founder, Hasan di Tiro, that Aceh would
become an Islamic state, with himself as sultan, have left a lasting impression.
‘‘Acheh will be an Islamic State because the people of Acheh will want it so;’’ di Tiro
said. ‘‘If the world wants to see this conﬁrmed by referendum, I have no objection to
such a referendum, because I know my people will want an Islamic State’’ (cited in
Hulst, 1991). While this implied a certain religious determinism, it still allowed that
this predicted outcome would arrive via a democratic process. In part, di Tiro’s
comments can also be seen in light of his own political origins, which were as a
representative of the Darul Islam rebellion.
It is probably reasonable to assume that, based on the GAM’s own stated
preference for a civil, non-Islamic state and its rejection of syariah, that the term
‘‘Islamic’’ in the above context refers to ‘‘inﬂuenced’’ rather than ‘‘determined.’’
According to Malik Mahmud, ‘‘Throughout centuries, the state of Acheh and Islam
co-existed in perfect harmony. The law of the state was based on civil law whilst
deriving its moral content from Islam as well as elements of Acehnese traditions
which did not contradict with Islam and this should remain so in the future.’’ There
has been and remains considerable debate within Islam about the nature of the
relationship between religion and the state, and even in Indonesia there is a politico-
religious tradition that insists that the state should function under syariah, while in
other contexts the state is only seen by some Muslims as existing as an operational
mechanism for Islam (see Fealy and Platzdasch, 2003). This idea was most clearly
seen in the idea of the caliphate, in which polities existed within an empire devoted to
the propagation of Islam, and which is claimed to inform politico-religious
movements such as the governing council, the Ahlul Halli wal ‘Aqdi (AHWA) of
the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI – Indonesian Religious Struggle Council)
which in turn is the parent body of the terrorist organisation Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI –
Islamic Community) (for the caliphate movement, see Ba’asyir, 2000; Baraja, 2000;
also Khilafah Online, 2004).
Along with the MMI’s commitment to introducing Islamic law to Indonesia, the
AHWA also had the further goal of establishing a new international caliphate, which
also arose in alleged JI intentions for maritime Southeast Asia. While Aceh was an
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independent state until 1873, it recognised the formal overlordship of the Islamic
caliphate located within the Turkish Ottoman Empire, and successfully appealed to
it for military support in its struggles with the Portuguese in the sixteenth century.
The crescent and star ﬂag banner of Islamic Aceh was that of the caliphate, and can
still be seen on the gravestones of Acehnese military leaders Panglima Pase and
Sjamsuddin al-Samudra on Bukit Cina in Malacca, where in 1629 they were killed
ﬁghting the occupying Portuguese. The ﬂag of GAM is essentially the same as that of
Ottoman Turkey, apart from black and white stripes at the top and bottom edges.16
While GAM acknowledged this historical legacy, the organisation actively
promoted the idea of an independent state and rejected the intervention of the
(non-caliphate supporting) Laskar Jihad in Aceh in 2002 and the MMI militias
Laskar Mujahidin and the Islamic Defenders’ Front following the tsunami of 24
December 2004. The clearest sign of a formal split between the descendents of the
Darul Islam ‘‘family’’ occurred in or around 1979, when an original GAM member,
Fauzi Hasbi, tried to persuade Hasan di Tiro to adopt a more overtly Islamic
posture. Di Tiro rejected this proposal. In 1984 the split between Hasbi and GAM
worsened and Hasbi left the organisation, establishing the Front Mujahidin Aceh
(ICG, 2002: 9-10). The split between Hasbi and di Tiro, over the distinction between
a local nationalist revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Aceh
as part of a larger Islamic federation, became virulent. GAM thereafter identiﬁed all
Acehnese involved with JI as traitors (Jones, 2003; ICG, 2002: 8). It was from this
time that GAM’s identiﬁcation as a purely nationalist organisation that rejected the
establishment of an Islamic state became clearly pronounced. Yet a belief in GAM’s
interest in establishing an Islamic state persisted, not least due to di Tiro’s own
commitment to Aceh’s acceptance of Islam.
The question remained if establishing an Islamic state was part of GAM’s political
agenda and, if so, whether this was to be through an imposition of syariah.
According to an interpretation of the Qur’an as outlined to the author by Nur Djuli
(Interview, 9 September 2005), the state should be run by a strong leader chosen by
his people, working in conjunction with an elected shura (council). Within this
system, the people retain the right to criticise their ruler. Finally, it is not necessary
that the state is run according to syariah, but it is necessary that the state has laws
that are in conformity with syariah. Taken as a political model, this perspective could
be equated with a republican system in which the head of state is elected and retains
considerable executive powers, but who rules with the support of a council (or
legislature). The right to criticise the ruler is usually understood as complying with
the ‘‘ﬁrst generation’’ political right of freedom of speech, which is generally argued
to be fundamental to democratic rule. Together, these qualities appear to comply
with conventional understandings of democracy, or rule by the people supported by
the safeguard of the right to speak out against poor government.
According to Nur Djuli, an understanding of political Islam that equates it with
either the secular state or an Islamic state is ‘‘clouded much by either the current
equation of Islam with tyrannical Middle-Eastern regimes or by the old Orientalism
propaganda’’ (Personal communication, 9 September 2005). This rejection of an
either/or reductionism means that it is possible for GAM to promote a cause based
on a nationalist identity rather than as an Islamic cause, and to reject the formal
imposition of syariah. At the same time, GAM members can maintain their full
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Islamic identity and strive for a state that is imbued with Islamic principles and
protects practice of the faith.
The conformity of civil law with syariah can be understood as somewhat more
restrictive, except that the main principles of syariah are largely not dissimilar to
legal principles applied under civil law on democratic states. Gambling, for
example, has been illegal in many democratic states. Similarly, drinking alcohol
has been outlawed at various times in various places, and restriction on the
consumption of alcohol in public places remains common in democratic states.
Until recently, adultery was also considered grounds for legal proceedings in
some democratic states while some sexual practices also continue to be illegal.
The moral value of law, then, does not appear to be a determinant of
democracy.
Until the early years of the new century, there was little formal thought within
GAM given to what sort of state an independent Aceh would be. The prevailing view
was that independence should be achieved ﬁrst, then the Acehnese people could
decide what sort of a state they wanted through a participatory process and
referendum (see Harsono, 2001). One common view within GAM at this time was
that Aceh would become a constitutional monarchy, somewhat like Thailand,
Malaysia or the UK, with Hasan di Tiro as sultan orWali Nanggroe.17 The view that
he could become sultan in large part stemmed from di Tiro’s claim that he is a
grandson of Teungku Tjik di Tiro Muhammad Saman, who was given the mandate,
as sultan, to continue the struggle against the Dutch invaders by Sultan Muhammad
Daud, just before the latter’s surrender and exile in 1903.18 On the question of
GAM’s orientation for Aceh, in 2002, Nur Djuli said that if Aceh became
independent it might choose to adopt Islamic law for Muslims, as in Malaysia, but
this would be done through a democratic process. ‘‘No-one can object if this is done
democratically,’’ he said (Personal communication, 15 July 2002). As noted by Nur
Djuli, the ASNLF:
‘‘. . . has never clearly stated the form it envisages for the eventual independent
State of Acheh is exactly due to this commitment to democracy. It is for the
people to decide what form of State they want to have upon independence. It is
quite logical to expect that being almost totally Muslim, the majority of the
Achehnese people would want to create an Islamic state. But what’s wrong with
that? If the majority of the people in a nation through a truly democratic
process want to form a socialist government, or an ultra nationalist government
or a Christian-Democratic government, it is still called a democratic state. . . . A
society that is clearly by tradition democratic, that has known its own brand of
separation of powers for centuries, cannot simply turn tyrannical, Islamic or
otherwise’’ (Djuli, 2005: 8).
Aceh and Tolerance
Along with being devout Muslims, most Acehnese also consider themselves to be
tolerant, both of outsiders and of non-Muslims. This tolerance derives from Aceh
pre-Islamic history as a Hindu territory and some of its domestic traditions, such as
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matrifocalism, notably in home ownership. But most importantly, as Djuli (2005:
4-5) explains, Aceh was subject to great external inﬂuence:
Being traders, Achehnese are very open to new ideas and to a diversity of
cultures. The fact that Acheh is located at one of the most strategic trading
crossroads of the world naturally adds to this openness. . . . Achehnese are a
trading society, a society while anchored in agriculture with a very rich and fertile
land; it is also one that is very outward looking, a society of sailors and explorers.
They brought back new ideas that encourage the formation of thinkers.
Even though Acehnese tend to cohere around a core cultural identity, this tolerance
implies an acceptance of cultural plurality, and reﬂects Aceh’s history as a recipient
of traders from many cultures, including those who brought Islam. It has been this
inﬂux of outsiders over several centuries that helped shape a general Acehnese sense
of tolerance, along with the Islamic observation of equality among diﬀerent peoples.
Many Acehnese are fond of noting the distinctly diﬀerent physical – especially
facial – characteristics of Achenese people, noting that this reﬂects their hetero-
geneous ancestral origins. In discussions with Acehnese, in particular GAM
members and NGO activists, they have said that it was not what a person looks
like that makes them Acehnese, but what is in their heart. Some scholars have
privately noted that this does not conform to the idea of an Acehnese ‘‘heartland’’ in
North Aceh, which is born out in the strength of support in this area for a separate
Acehnese identity. However, GAM also showed that it was not limited to this area,
by including in senior organisational positions (ancestrally Minang, from West
Sumatra) Acehnese from West Aceh as well as ethnic Gayo and Alas from the
territory’s highlands.
This Acehnese notion of tolerance may also include non-Muslims, who tend to be
understood by Acehnese in ways that can be assessed against a pre-existing value
system. Therefore, a person who is not necessarily Muslim will be judged according
to his or her intentions and actions. If these accord with an Acehnese understanding
of, for example, notions of good and bad, or dignity and propriety, the person will be
understood and accepted (or rejected) in those terms. It can be suggested that this
tolerance implies an acceptance of pluralism that further enhances an underlying
tendency towards democratic principles; that core notions of ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ are
generally clearly deﬁned, there is considerable openness to and potential for
acceptance of diﬀerences of outlook, a competition of ideas, and an acceptance of
the idea of a ‘‘loyal opposition.’’ The issue of the ‘‘imposition’’ of Islam, for example
by the central government, then, is problematic not because it is Islam, but because it
is imposed, because it allows no variation within it; nor does it tolerate diﬀerence, or
accept pre-existing plurality.
GAM and Islamic ‘‘Co-option’’
The distance that has grown between GAM and any formal political commitment to
Islam has in part developed in response to the perceived co-opting of much of Aceh’s
ulama by the New Order government. After having led the Darul Islam rebellion,
Aceh’s ulamas were increasingly viewed by GAM as being aligned with state agendas
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and working on behalf of the state. In Aceh, this was understood as exploiting Aceh
for the beneﬁt of Jakarta. Notably, the pan-Indonesian Majelis Ulama Indonesia
(Indonesian Ulamas Council – MUI) was speciﬁcally seen to have been co-opted by
the New Order government, and used as a government tool to subjugate any sense of
Acehnese separateness. Further, Aceh’s own Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama
(Ulamas Consultative Assembly – MPU), which comprised 27 leading ulamas, was
chaired by Dr. Muslim Ibrahim, who was also chair of MUI Aceh, thus
compromising the MPU. Dr. Ibrahim was educated in Cairo, a leading international
centre of Islamic scholarship, but one which promotes an Islamic orthodoxy that is
often out of keeping with Acehnese Islamic practices.
Similarly, a leading ulama, Imam Sujak, was a member of the MPU while also
being chairman of the Aceh branch of the modernist religious organisation
Muhammaduyah, as well as a member of Indonesia’s legislature, the People’s
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat – DPR) for the National
Mandate Party (Partai Amanmat Nasional – PAN). In 2005, members of PAN in
Jakarta were outspoken in their assertion that Aceh should be maintained as a
province of the unitary state of Indonesia under existing legislative requirements,
which was directly counter to Acehnese claims to either independence or, at that time,
self-government. That is, Imam Sujak’s political focus lay primarily with organisations
that promoted a national structure (and indeed nationalism), while also being
represented in an Acehnese organisation. It was these types of broader pan-Indonesian
political identity that alienated GAM from many formal Islamic organisations, even
though GAM did receive support from some more assertively pro-Aceh ulamas.
As a result of this perceived co-option of ulamas, Islam could be seen not just as a
means of subverting a separate Acehnese identity, but also creating a sense of
extramural Islamic identity that subsumed Aceh within it. The use of Islam as tool of
imposed political cohesion was most pronounced in the introduction or imposition
(depending on diﬀerent perspectives) of syariah by the central government in 2001.
This move was intended as a means of buying oﬀ Acehnese unhappiness with
Jakarta’s heavy-handed rule. Despite GAM’s opposition, some non-GAM Acehnese
welcomed the introduction of syariah, and its application has gained currency, at
least to the extent that the Wilayatul Hisbah (syariah police) are made up of
Acehnese who pursue their duties with some vigour. Since the introduction of
syariah, individuals have been arrested for gambling and having sex outside
marriage, and in some cases have been ﬂogged in public ceremonies that attract
crowds of up to 200. Many ulama were also in favour of the introduction if syariah,
and if it was not necessarily authentically ‘‘Acehnese,’’ perhaps this reﬂected some
competition over claims to such a singular authenticity. There is little doubt that the
descendents of Darul Islam who did not adopt di Tiro’s ‘‘nationalist’’ position have
favoured the introduction of syariah, as did most of the non-GAM ulama. A not
insigniﬁcant number of urban Acehnese also supported it, probably feeling more
comfortable aligned with ‘‘modernist’’ Islam as identiﬁed with the National Mandate
Party (PAN – Partai Amanat Nasional), which was the main political expression of
the modernist religious organisation Muhammadiyah and which had some political
support in Aceh. Some ulama had also studied in the Middle East and were more
familiar with a conventional interpretation of Sunni Islam, as opposed to the ‘‘folk’’
interpretation of some nonetheless devout followers in Aceh.
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Based on the perspectives of often external or externally inﬂuenced ulama (such as
Muslim Ibrahim), the decision to introduce syariah in its ‘‘non-Acehnese’’ form was
taken because Acehnese Islam was out of step with more orthodox interpretations
and considered that it would beneﬁt from a reformulation derived from the Middle
East, in particular from one of the centres of Islamic learning, Cairo. The character
of the Islam that arrived under syariah, then, was not only imposed, but for many
Acehnese it was also alien. It was the imposition of this quite strict form of Islam
that angered many Acehnese, who viewed it as intolerant and therefore as un-
Acehnese, and as another means of Jakarta asserting its political will over Aceh.
An illustration of a particularly Acehnese practice of Islam concerns how many
raka’at (sessions) one should do in the taraweh prayer (evening prayer during the
holy month of Ramadhan). Many Muslims in Aceh believe that prayer is a sunnah
(‘‘meritorious’’ or worthy) duty, but not wajib (‘‘obligatory’’). As a consequence,
there is considerable freedom in Aceh about how many taraweh prayers may be
oﬀered, while in other parts of Islamic Southeast Asia this is often more strictly
deﬁned. While there is some ﬂexibility around the matter of taraweh prayers, many
Acehnese are concerned not to commit bid’ah (‘‘innovation’’), or undertake religious
deeds not clearly prescribed by the sunnah rasulullah (prophet’s example). The
principle is that it is wrong to either add or subtract from the holy teachings. This
even applies to dress, with some Acehnese disapproving of men praying in long and
loose gowns, which is common elsewhere, because that is not how Muhammad
performed prayers and it is thus regarded as showing oﬀ and thus detracting from
the act of praying (Djuli, 2005:7). These diﬀerences put common Acehnese
interpretations of Islam somewhat at odds with external interpretations.
‘‘Good and Bad and What to do about it’’
Where Islam does clearly inﬂuence GAM is in the area of personal morality, which
then plays out in public life. Notions of justice and personal struggle are notable in
most understandings of Islam and were pronounced in interviews with a number of
GAM members.19 This was illustrated by the most public face of GAM, Bakhtiar
Abdullah, its information oﬃcer and the spokesman for its political wing. Bakhtiar
is known as one of the ‘‘political GAM,’’ his history with the organisation began in
1979 and he was with the ﬁrst intake of GAM recruits to Libya in 1986 to undertake
military training. One of Bakhtiar’s class-mates was Muzakkir Manaf who was, from
2002 until its disbandment in 2005, the commander-in-chief of GAM’s military
forces, Angkatan GAM (AGAM). Bakhtiar was a platoon leader from 1986 to 1987
and was an AGAM trainer in Libya from 1987 until 1990. Towards the end of 1991,
Bakhtiar was asked by the GAM leadership to join them in Stockholm. He agreed,
observing that, ‘‘Hasan di Tiro was my mentor.’’ By this stage, Libya was closing
down its military training camps for external organisations, following increased
international pressure. GAM, similarly, had decided to distance itself from Libya
over concern as to the possibility of being labelled a terrorist organisation.
Bakhtiar’s background identiﬁes him as being not just typical, but close to the
centre of GAM. He joined GAM to be a part of the struggle for Acehnese
independence, and was directly inﬂuenced by GAM’s founder, Hasan di Tiro. He
also followed in a family tradition, as many in GAM have done. He points out,
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‘‘My father was a strong supporter of GAM. He was a former commando as well,
and wanted to be sent with Mr Malik . . .’’ as a ﬁghter into Aceh, at the time that
Malik commanded AGAM. There was a unity for Bakhtiar between his commitment
to GAM and his commitment to Islam: ‘‘I was brought up in a family that has a very
religious background,’’ he said, adding, ‘‘I don’t have that much religious
knowledge, but I have a strong belief in practising Islam.’’
‘‘Filial piety has the utmost importance,’’ he said of Islam, ‘‘and to follow the
teachings of Islam. You must pray ﬁve times a day, which you must not miss for any
reason whatsoever. I try to follow the exact teachings. You do the best you can.’’
Bakhtiar, however, is unimpressed with external forms of Islam: ‘‘I don’t wear the
hajj cap or carry the beads. You have to be able to read the Qu’ran, you have to say
your prayers. But I was in a mixed school, so of course you have love aﬀairs.’’
Bakhtiar echoed a sentiment that sets apart many Acehnese Muslims from more
orthodox or Middle-eastern inspired followers when he says, ‘‘From our point of
view, Islam is a way of life. Acehnese are true Muslims according to what we believe,
but not what is portrayed in Arab countries.’’
For Bakhtiar there is one particular point at which Islam and political struggle
intersected. Islam ‘‘is a ﬁst religion, a religion of the ﬁst, a religion of the sword,’’ he
said. ‘‘In Aceh we would die for Islam.’’ However, he also noted the distinction
between Islam as a motivation and its imposition, stating ‘‘But that doesn’t mean we
are militant [about Islam].’’ Islam informs his views on political struggle, and
Bakhtiar sees no separation between the two: ‘‘We believe that in continuing this
struggle, in the Qu’ran there is a part that says those who continue the struggle will
obtain shahid, will become witness.’’ Shahid literally translates as ‘‘witness,’’ but is
also commonly used as the translation for ‘‘martyr’’ (‘‘martyr’’ being the original
term for ‘‘witness,’’ but having developed a somewhat separate meaning, which more
accurately, in this context, is understood as someone who chooses to die rather than
renounce religious principles, or who undergoes suﬀering to further a belief, cause or
principle. This struggle for a principle is jihad (which is widely understood as ‘‘holy
war,’’ although ‘‘principled struggle’’ is perhaps a more accurate translation). ‘‘Even
in Islam you have to ﬁght for your rights,’’ Bakhtiar noted, adding: ‘‘That is what a
Muslim has to do.’’
‘‘But,’’ he said ‘‘that doesn’t mean you would establish an Islamic state with
Islamic laws. Religious law is under the ulamas, who are highly respected. Syariah is
separate to civil law. It [syariah] is the law of deeds [of personal behaviour]. It doesn’t
mean you have to whip people in public,’’ he said in reference to the implementation
in Aceh of public whipping for adultery, gambling and a range of other ‘‘sins.’’ He
states that this is ‘‘not the real syariah law.’’ Malik Mahmud agreed with Bakhtiar on
this point: ‘‘Syariah Law is applicable both as a personal set of laws as well as a
universal set of law – whichever one feels comfortable with.’’
Bakhtiar continues, explaining that, ‘‘According to Islamic law you have to try to
do the good and stop the bad,’’ so that if you are a person:
. . . who holds close to religion, you are tempted, but you hold to your faith. You
will not be tempted to do the bad. You should try your utmost to fast in
Ramadhan, but if you can’t that is okay. You should try to follow the ﬁve
pillars of Islam. Most important is prayers, to make sure the prayers are being
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done. Prayers are a shield against all vices or any temptation that would disrupt
your faith, [and for] deciding what is good and bad and what you do about it.
How you should behave in these situations. It really determines which is good
and which is bad.
In this, Islamic principles clearly inﬂuence personal judgment, and acting on that
judgment – ‘‘what you do about it’’ – also derives from Islam. This is understood as
striving for justice, a personal jihad, even if it is shared with others. In taking on this
jihad for oneself, it does not therefore imply that struggle or the principles that
underpin it can or should be imposed on others. According to Bakhtiar, faith in
Islam ‘‘. . . does not imply a person who has committed a sin should be stoned to
death, or a thief to chop oﬀ his hands. We are human beings. We make mistakes,
sometimes even against your faith. You redeem your sins and try to change.’’
For Bakhtiar, the distinction between ‘‘good and bad and what to do about it’’ is
also driven by his personal responses to perceptions of injustice, which in turn tie in
with his understanding of Islam’s capacity for use of force. In particular, Bakhtiar
felt aggrieved about the Acehnese sense of ‘‘national identity, and our great sacriﬁce
against the colonial powers.’’ He states:
It is really frustrating when you are only taught two pages of your own history
in history books. The Indonesians have managed to really make us some kind of
other person. [They have tried] to change our national identity. And with all
these atrocities, it makes you even more determined. It is against Islam, all these
killings and raping. It is against all religions for that matter.
In this, Bakhtiar expressed amore broadly shared concern over the systematic rewriting
of one’s people’s history, and the committing of oﬀences against one’s people.
While Bakhtiar is a committed, practising Muslim, his colleague Teungku
Hanadeuh reﬂected a similar commitment to principles of justice, if not quite to the
formalities of the religion. Hanadeuh is one name of several he used as a senior
member of the GAM intelligence organisation. Like many members of GAM, he has
been jailed for his activities, and it was in jail that he says he was a more devout
practising Muslim. ‘‘A strong belief?’’ he asked rhetorically about his faith in Islam.
‘‘Yes, of course. There was a time when I prayed continuously. That’s when I was in
jail.’’ In a matter of fact way, Hanadeuh explained that he prayed in jail, ‘‘Because I
had time to be introspective. There’s plenty of time to do that. Not much temptation.
When you are outside you are in the marketplace and you don’t have much time to
go home, or in the oﬃce where there is no prayer house, or postponing, ﬁve more
minutes, ﬁve more minutes, and then the time for prayer is over.’’
Hanadeuh later qualiﬁed his assessment of himself as a Muslim, explaining, ‘‘I am
not a really pious Muslim, but I am good Muslim. That is, I have the understanding
of the belief. I read and I study.’’ But, he acknowledged, sometimes ‘‘I didn’t just
follow [Islamic practice].’’ Like many Acehnese, while he believed himself to be a
good Muslim, it was the guiding principles of Islam that informed his political
beliefs. When asked what principles those were, he replied: ‘‘Equality, for one. There
should be no superior or inferior race in the world. The Javanese have been claiming
in Aceh they are superior, ﬁrst class.’’20
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Along with equality, Hanadeuh was opposed to theft, both of material possessions
and of what he viewed as his political independence: ‘‘There should be no stealing of
someone else’s possessions, let alone to steal someone else sovereignty or country.’’
This in turn led to the question of justice, and the ways that religion can function as a
mechanism for social purposes: ‘‘Everyone needs justice. Being in prison, I learned
more about justice and what justice the Indonesian government has oﬀered to the
Acehnese people. Justice is not limited to one or two religions, it is universal.
Religion only provides a means and way to participate in justice.’’
Echoing Bakhtiar’s observations on Islam being a ‘‘religion of the ﬁst, a religion of
the sword,’’ Hanadeuh stated that within Islam, ‘‘Fighting is acceptable because you
must defend your rights against anyone.’’ In this, there was no divisibility between
the right to practice one’s religion and the right to determine one’s other social or
political aﬀairs. Further, noting a sense of mutual responsibility between Muslims,
Hanadeuh was critical of states comprised of Islamic peoples who attacked or tried
to control their neighbours. ‘‘Indonesia has claimed themselves as Muslim,’’ he said,
‘‘but Muslims should not steal other Muslims’ possessions. That is why Iraq had to
leave Kuwait, and Turkey had to give up the Arabian peninsula.’’
Also reﬂecting Bakhtiar’s comments on shahid, Hanadeuh stated that: ‘‘If you get
killed when you defend your possessions, your land, you are a martyr, after you fulﬁl
all your duties.’’ But he qualiﬁed the acceptability of ﬁghting, noting that it had to be
for a good cause: ‘‘If your intention is to go to war to expect a good position for
yourself, then you are not a martyr. Being a martyr is sacriﬁcing yourself for the
bigger cause.’’ Similarly, according to Nur Djuli, the link between Islam, notions of
justice and GAM’s struggle is that:
. . . put simply, GAM soldiers want to go to heaven when they are killed in
battle. But it is not that they want to go to heaven and thus join GAM as a
ladder. Being Muslim, GAM soldiers believe that it is the demand of their
religion to ﬁght for their right, to right the wrong, to regain their national
honour. They do not ﬁght for freedom in order to be good Muslims, but
because they are good Muslims. Consequently, in practical terms, GAM does
not ﬁght for Islam, but because they are Muslims. Islam forbids acceptance of
injustice (Personal communication, 9 September 2005).
While many Acehnese, and in particular in GAM, reject formalist Islamic teachings
that derive from the Middle East, some such as GAMmember Munawar Lisa do still
regard formal study in Islam’s great universities as important. Munawar studied for
seven years at the Islamic University in Cairo and speaks and writes, among other
languages, ﬂuent Arabic. Munawar ran the Aceh Information Oﬃce in Pittsburgh,
USA, until moving to Stockholm to assist with GAM’s political organisation in
August 2005. He says, ‘‘I try to be a good Muslim,’’ explaining that: ‘‘To be a good
Muslim is to do all the obligations Muslims have to do and also to prevent things
that are forbidden, things that are munkar [evil].’’
According to Munawar, the key link between Islam and GAM is through the
struggle for justice: ‘‘What we do is an obligation of every Muslim, which is to bring
justice to the people. And we also have an obligation to do good things, to ﬁght
against injustice.’’ This ﬁght against injustice is ‘‘an order of God in the Qu’ran and
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also in the Hadith21 and it is also the teachings of Islam to bring justice to the
people.’’ But his inspiration, while based in Islam, is not sourced from Islam alone:
‘‘Also why I do this is because of my personal commitment to the people of Aceh.’’
While many join GAM through family contacts, Munawar said that he came to
GAM independently: ‘‘I became a supporter because of my reading of the history of
Aceh,’’ Adding, ‘‘I don’t have any relatives in GAM. It is my own motivation to be
GAM because of what I see.’’ Munawar said his ﬁrst experience of inequality was
after he completed his elementary study:
I went to Java to continue my study. I found that it is very diﬀerent between
Java and Aceh; in the faces of the people, in Aceh they are suﬀering, in Java
they are relaxed. The infrastructure; in my village we didn’t have any electricity,
no asphalt road, no cleaning, they have everything in Java. This is injustice, I
was on ﬁre. I saw very well the discrimination against the people of Aceh by the
government of Java.
Munawar explains, ‘‘I understand that justice is a whole thing in terms of
humanity,’’ indicating that justice in social and political life and justice in Islam were
not separate. ‘‘The people of Aceh can get their rights. To do obligations, all of one’s
duty, is to help the people.’’
Helping others, or exercising a social conscience, appeared to be important to
many Acehnese spoken to by the author. In discussions about acceptance of non-
practising Muslims, a number of those spoken to at diﬀerent times said that being a
good Muslim was manifested in fulﬁlling one’s social obligations and doing good
deeds as prescribed by the Qur’an.22
On moral behaviour, Munawar also noted that his sense of obligation came not
just from Islam, but also from being a human being. ‘‘As humans we have an
obligation to do good things, to help other people,’’ he said. ‘‘It is to help them get
all their rights without any restrictions.’’ Munawar also highlighted the egalitarian
aspects of Islam. ‘‘Equality; it’s very respectful. It is our faith to be equal between
poor and rich, between men and women, between small and big. We call it musaawat.
It is equality.’’ According to Munawar, equality, both in Islam and in secular society,
was linked to justice: ‘‘It is also in our faith to have justice, for every colour of
people, every level of the people, must get the justice. Women must get justice. . . . Is
there a link to Aceh?’’ he asked rhetorically. ‘‘Sure,’’ he said, answering his own
question, ‘‘What happened in Aceh is injustice. It is a restriction of the rights of the
people. We want to change it.’’
Again referring to the commonality between Islam and his political belief,
Munawar said: ‘‘The most important things that, even if I am not Muslim, but they
are oppressed, living under injustice, I will ﬁght the same way to deliver justice for
them.’’ But, he acknowledged:
It is a Muslim principle. What we need to do is love each other, no matter
what religion somebody is or what race, what gender or what level he has in
society. We need to love each other to make justice all over the world. We
need to love Muslims, we need to love non-Muslims. That is the only way to
save the world.
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Women in Aceh and GAM
If Hanadeuh understood his political views as being inﬂuenced by, but in some sense
separate from, Islam, GAM negotiating team member and US resident Shadia
Marhaban took that idea one step further. ‘‘There is no relation between religion and
politics,’’ she said. ‘‘Good politics is a result of hard work and commitment.’’ But,
she said, the hard work and commitment was guided by belief: ‘‘I believe there is a
power on top of what we’re doing. I believe someone is seeing from up high.’’
On Islam, ‘‘I fast, I pray . . . sometimes,’’ she said. ‘‘I consider myself as a good
Muslim. I have a good understanding of Islam. But I am not pious, not an imam or
whatever.’’ Having lived in the US following the collapse of the CoHA and travelled
considerably, Marhaban has had wider experience than many others, and believes
this has inﬂuenced her outlook: ‘‘From my background and knowledge from being
an international traveller, I have had more opportunity to see how the world lives,
how people live, how people suﬀer, how they should live in a better place.’’ It is this,
she said, that has spurred her social conscience, which informs her work on Aceh.
Marhaban joined the Helsinki peace process as the only woman attached to either
of the two negotiating teams, and the Indonesian delegation informally objected to
her participating in the negotiating process on the grounds that she is a woman. The
political position of women is an issue that Marhaban believed was important. ‘‘The
role of women? Well, that is something I need to ﬁght for,’’ she said, adding:
I think the [Islamic] culture more brings the women in to a situation where they
live in a patriarchal society, where women are repressed, have a lack of rights to
speak, to do what they want to do. It is men together, it is in the Qu’ran also,
but it doesn’t say speciﬁcally that we have to do this, we have to do that.
Acehnese society is traditionally matrifocal, but this has been tempered by
conventional Islamic tenets.23 Women have an important and respected place in
Acehnese society, which was traditionally matrifocal (see Siegel, 1969: Ch. 7). To
that end, Acehnese women traditionally retained their own names after marriage,
and Acehnese children were traditionally born in the house of their mother, which is
usually given to her by her father (Loeb, 1974: 220). The expression for the wife is, in
fact, ‘‘the one who owns the house’’ (nyang peurumoh). Traditionally, although
property and parenting were bilateral (men and women each held approximately
equal rights to ownership), men would go to live in the house and the village of their
wife. Acehnese also diﬀer from other Muslims in the region in their interpretations of
the Sunni Syaﬁi doctrine, such as in the matter of divorce. In Malaysia, where Sunni
Islam is more conventional, a man can pronounce divorcing his wife three times and
that concludes the matter (Ng, 2003; see also Otterman, 2005). In the Acehnese
interpretation, according to Nur Djuli, divorce is understood to be primarily by deed
and not words. As implied above, divorce initiated by women (fasah) is also
generally easier in Aceh than elsewhere (see Mantu, 2003).
In studying the role of women in Aceh, Siapno (1998) observed a long tradition of
ﬁghting women, including warrior-queens, and a long history of political agency in
Aceh that transcended gender boundaries (see also Siapno, 2002). However,
Marhaban is more sanguine about the position of women: ‘‘In Aceh it seems like
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there’s a brick wall in front of women and they can’t break through,’’ she said. ‘‘So
there’s the women’s struggle as well.’’
While Marhaban is a relatively outspoken woman in an Islamic context, she is not
out of step with other women in Aceh, many of whom retain considerable authority
over a range of aﬀairs. Added to her worldliness and modernist inﬂuences,
Marhaban is also doubtful about taking literally the teachings of the Qu’ran: ‘‘Of
course, the Qu’ran was written ages ago and the situation is diﬀerent,’’ she said.
Noting the relatively high status of women in traditional Acehnese society and in
keeping with the Prophet Muhammad’s last sermon, Bakhtiar also noted that
‘‘Women also have a very high status in Aceh, they are very respectable. I help my
wife with all the chores and all of that.’’ Drawing on that part of the Qu’ran that
upholds the position of women, Bakhtiar said: ‘‘It is a way of life in Islam where
women are respectfully treated, for their loyalty, for their status as a woman. But not
in Middle-East countries. I saw even in Libya the women are far away back.’’ The
role of women in GAM is viewed by many outsiders as mixed, but as Bakhtiar noted:
‘‘We even send our women, Inong Balee,24 to participate in important meetings.
They have a very high status, if not on a par with men, But we treat them with
dignity and respect.’’ The Inong Balee was originally formed in the sixteenth century
by a female Acehnese naval admiral, Malahayati, who is credited with defeating a
Portuguese ﬂeet in the Straits of Malacca. Malahayati founded the Inong Balee of
women whose husbands and ﬁance´s had been killed in battle.
The link between the role of women and democracy revolves around notions of
political equality. It is clear that as an Islamic and in many respects still traditional
society, Aceh does not accord women full and equal rights with men. However, there
is recognition within GAM of the role and rights of women, and this ﬁeld remains
contested. This contestation, and the relative respect accorded to women by GAM
members, does imply a move towards political parity, if that has not yet actually
been realised.
Conclusion: Being Acehnese
According to Nur Djuli, being Acehnese and Muslim is one and the same, even if it is
understood within Aceh in a speciﬁcally Acehnese way:
. . . we Achehnese do have our own ways, those ways are not necessarily the
same as practised by others, and while we are not saying that our ways are
better, we do not want others to dictate their ways to us either. The fact is, for us
Achehnese the rituals of the religion are less important than moral attitude. For
Achehnese, being Achehnese is being Muslim. We live the religion, from birth to
death. We do not need a label or proof to tell the world we are Muslim. We do
not need laws to force ourselves, much less others, to practice the religion. We
have been and still are practising our religion, even under oppression. Islam has
never fallen in Acheh, hence there is no necessity to ﬁght for it; it is as strong as
ever. For Achehnese, it is our freedom, not our religion, that has fallen and that
is why, and for what, the Achehnese are struggling. In fact it is the demand of
our religion that we ﬁght for freedom, not the other way around that we need
freedom in order to be able to practice our religion. It is in this context that the
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ASNLF has totally rejected the introduction by Jakarta of the so-called Syariat
Law for Acheh. Following the introduction of this law, the provincial
government has duly formed the religious police, whose very ﬁrst act was to
chase unveiled women in the streets. This was not in keeping with the wishes or
beliefs of us Achehnese (Djuli, 2005: 8).
Malik Mahmud concurred, saying: ‘‘It is not compulsory that it (syariah) should be
adopted or used by every Muslim society or country in the world, hence GAM’s
rejection of syariah from Jakarta.’’
One important idea that was repeated by members of the negotiating team during
the Helsinki peace talks was that while the outcome of that process, by way of
example, would be a consequence of God’s will, God had also endowed people with
intelligence, will and capacity. That is, it was beholden upon good Muslims not to be
passive in the face of injustice, but actively to pursue the struggle against it. In other
words, God’s will would be realised only with the discretionary participation of his
creation; people. This had two consequences. The ﬁrst consequence was, in
accordance with an understanding of the will of God, it is the intention (niat) of
the struggle and method by which it is carried out that is important, not the
outcome. As such, the end of the struggle cannot justify all possible methods, which
is the main reason why the Aceh conﬂict was conﬁned to Aceh and did not spread,
via terrorism, to Indonesia’s many vulnerable cities. According to Nur Djuli, ‘‘the
hardest part of the Achehnese struggle [was] . . . to maintain our dignity and religious
belief in facing such an uncivilised, barbaric and inhuman enemy.’’ Maintaining this
dignity was, he said, ‘‘our true jihad.’’ That is, just behaviour remained a guiding
principle of Acehnese Islam. The second consequence was that, endowed with
intelligence, will and capacity, it was beholden upon believers to create a political
system imbued with justice. Accepting the election of a leader and a council, and
including tolerance of diﬀerence and a type of separation of powers, Islam in Aceh
established the key prerequisites for the successful implementation of democracy.
The Helsinki peace process which ended GAM’s conﬂict with Indonesia was
intended to introduce local government to the province, putting into practice
something corresponding to the high degree of genuine autonomy that had been
originally sought in the early 1950s (see Kingsbury, 2006 on the Aceh peace process).
All senior GAM members spoken with by the author conﬁrmed there would be no
return to conﬂict. The question was more about the extent to which the enabling
legislation passed by the Indonesian legislature in July 2006 fulﬁlled the conditions of
the agreement, and the government’s continuing ability to control restive military
elements intent on reasserting their role in the province. What was most of interest,
however, in relation to GAM and Islam, was whether or not GAM would re-invent
itself as a formal political party, as allowed under the peace agreement, and to what
extent would both its Islamic and democratic values imbue its party platform. Early
indications were that GAM would indeed inform a political party, if one that more
closely corresponded to conventional social democratic values than explicitly Islamic
ones. There were also tensions within GAM over participatory and autocratic
political styles as the rhetoric of democracy clashed with traditional leadership roles,
which were increasingly being resolved in favour of participatory processes. Ahead
of Aceh’s elections for the governorship and other administrative posts, it appeared
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as though not just procedural but also substantive democracy was taking root within
the organisation. A common view among middle-level GAM commanders was they
had not fought one form of authoritarianism in order to submit to another. The twin
commitments to justice and equality by GAM’s membership appeared to imply a
democratic logic by default.
Notes
1 This article is a substantially revised and expanded version of an earlier draft paper that was
electronically published by the Programa de Estudios: Asia & China as Working Paper No. 06.
2 The spelling of ‘‘Acheh’’ reﬂects an Acehnese/Achehnese rejection of the Indonesian ‘‘new spelling’’
(ejaan baru), which changed the name of the Dutch Atjeh to Aceh. The use of ‘‘Acheh’’ therefore
connotes Acehnese nationalism. This article employs the spelling ‘‘Aceh’’ because it retains some
neutrality even when used by those who might otherwise support various Acehnese claims to autonomy
or independence. All other spellings are either as approved spellings of Arabic words by GAM or are
Acehnese spellings/language.
3 With the signing of the peace agreement, GAM’s claims to a separate nationalist identity formally no
longer exist.
4 Malik Mahmud was named as Prime Minister of the State of Acheh in the Stavanger Declaration
(correspondence from Malik Mahmud to the author, 17 October 2005).
5 The following is a sketch of the Aceh conﬂict, to help contextualise the discussion. A fuller treatment
can be found in Aspinall and Crouch (2003) and Reid (2006).
6 There had been two previous agreements to reduce conﬂict in Aceh, both of which comprehensively
failed, primarily as a consequence of TNI (or ABRI) intransigence.
7 This assessment was undertaken by Matt Davies in August 2003, based on open-source information.
Davies’ assessment counted TNI and Polri by unit, and provided totals for each of the services involved
in Aceh.
8 The PRRI-Permesta rebellion was essentially aimed at changing the political orientation of the state, as
well as refocusing attention towards the outer islands.
9 While DII was not a separatist rebellion, many Acehnese, including the ASNLF, claim that Aceh’s
participation was to secure either independence or a high degree of local autonomy, which is borne out
by the declaration of the NBA in 1955. The main part of this period of rebellion ended in 1957,
although with some hold-outs lasting until 1959 and others until 1963 with the ending of Darul Islam.
10 Based on discussions with a number of senior GAM oﬃcials and members of the GAM negotiating
team, in Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe and Kuala Lumpur, in 2001 and 2002.
11 The variation in ﬁgures derives from a range of public and private sources. The ﬁgure that is usually
quoted, including by some NGOs and most of the media, is 10,000. GAM claims that 26,000 people
were killed during this period. However, there do not appear to be any reliable statistics about this
matter.
12 The primary diﬀerence is that Aceh (and Papua) was allowed to retain the province as the primary site
of local administration, whereas elsewhere regional autonomy was devolved to the sub-provincial level.
13 This responsibility tested the resources of the ANSLF/GAM, which was not equipped to progress from
revolutionary activity to functional self-government.
14 The Acehnese Sultan Iskandar Muda, who was at war with the Portuguese in Malacca, heard that
Pahang, another Malay Sultanate on the East Coast of the Peninsula, was about to make an alliance
with the Portuguese. He invaded the sultanate in 1617; but instead of destroying it, he married its
princess and gave an Acehnese territory, Jambi in Central Sumatra, as a gift to an uncle of his new wife.
Recognising the Malay princess as very knowledgeable in traditional etiquette, the sultan gave her the
power to set rules for the culture of his kingdom; her kanun (rulings) continue to be practised by many
Acehense (see Djuli, 2005: 5).
15 Similar to a contemporary chief of police.
16 The crescent and star banner on the gravestones was noted during a visit to this grave site with several
GAM commanders in January 2005 during a day oﬀ from democratisation training and party building,
conducted by the Olof Palme International Center in Kuala Lumpur.
17 This observation is based on conversations with GAM members in Aceh in 2001 and 2002.
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18 Hasan di Tiro (1984: introduction) also claims that it was his uncle, Tengku Tjhik Maat di Tiro, who
was the last ‘‘head of state’’ of Aceh. In 1975, Nur Djuli says di Tiro was the eighth descendant of the
Teungku Tjhik di Tiro ‘‘who was asked to rule Acheh by the Royal Council when the Sultan was killed
in battle and his son was still an infant’’ (Djuli, 2005: 12).
19 The section that follows draws on interviews conducted by the author, near Kuala Lumpur, on 11
August 2005 and in Helsinki on 13 and 14 August 2005.
20 Equality complies with the Prophet Muhammad’s last sermon in which he said: ‘‘All mankind is from
Adam and Eve, an Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority over
an Arab; also a white has no superiority over a black nor a black has any superiority over a white –
except by piety and good action’’ http://www.submission.org.sermon.html (downloaded 8 September
2005).
21 Narrative of the life of the Prophet Muhammad (sallallahu alaiyhi wa sallam) and what he approved.
22 These comments were made by, among others, Malik Mahmud, Bakhtiar Abdullah and Nur Djuli at
diﬀerent times between October 2004 and August 2005.
23 A recent ICG report (2006) has been particularly critical of the impact of syariah on women in Aceh.
24 The Inong Balee is an AGAM women’s battalion, primarily comprised of widows and daughters of
slain AGAM ﬁghters. The Inong Balee wore the Islamic headscarf (hejab, or jilbab in Indonesian) along
with camouﬂage uniforms, and were armed with AK-47 assault riﬂes.
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